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THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AGREEMENT 
WITH EXCEPTIONAL THEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS
Felipe Miguel 
Suppose that you realize that a substantial majority of the most important 
philosophers of all time agreed with you on some proposition p. Intuitively, 
you have gained additional evidence in favor of p and you should increase 
your confidence that p is true. It turns out that a large number of the most 
important philosophers of all time (in fact, the vast majority, if we consider, as 
we will, a recent poll conducted with contemporary philosophers) were the-
ists. In this paper, I explore the epistemic significance of agreement with these 
philosophers with respect to their theistic beliefs. I argue that agreement with 
such philosophers does provide evidence in favor of theism.
Introduction
What did Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and 
Kant have in common? Besides being some of the greatest philosophers 
who have ever lived, they were also classical theists or deists. Aquinas, 
Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Kant were professed Christian theists. Plato 
and Aristotle held views about God that should probably be classified as 
deistic. All of these thinkers formulated arguments for the existence of a 
God.1 This also includes Socrates, as portrayed by Xenophon.2 Matters are 
a little less clear with respect to the portrayal of Socrates’ religious beliefs 
in the Platonic writings, though it is clear that Socrates believed that gods 
exist and that there is a divine reality beyond the physical world.
AQ1–AQ5
1Plato (cosmological and ontological arguments); Aristotle (cosmological argument); 
Aquinas (his five ways); Descartes (ontological argument); Locke (argument from con-
sciousness, cosmological argument); Leibniz (cosmological and ontological arguments, the 
arguments from possibility and from necessary truths); Kant (moral argument, the argu-
ment from possibility). Discussion of these arguments can be found in Oppy, Ontological 
Arguments and Belief in God; Oppy, Arguing About Gods; Craig, The Cosmological Argument from 
Plato to Leibniz; Evans, Moral Arguments for the Existence of God; and Chignell and Pereboom, 
Natural Theology and Natural Religion.
2Xenophon portrays Socrates as a proponent of an argument from natural beauty to the 
existence of a divine creator. See De Cruz and De Smedt, A Natural History of Natural Theology, 
for discussion.
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Another characteristic that these thinkers have in common is that a 
recent poll conducted with contemporary philosophers selected them,3 
along with Hume and Wittgenstein, as the ten most important philoso-
phers of all time. Although it is safe to say that half of the philosophers men-
tioned above were classical theists and that 30% percent of them embraced 
something like deism, Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s views are more ambig-
uous. While several Hume scholars believe that he was a deist, a good 
case can be made in favor of agnosticism and perhaps atheism as better 
representing his views. And while Wittgenstein seemed to be attracted to 
a religious form of life and to a religious way of seeing the world, there is 
enough ambiguity in his writings on religious matters to defy attempts to 
easily include him in any of these categories. In any case, it is a notable fact 
that 80% percent of the philosophers selected as the ten most important 
of all time were classical theists or deists and that the remainder 20% held 
ambiguous views regarding theism and cannot be indisputably declared 
to be atheist philosophers, considering that between 85% and 75% of con-
temporary philosophers self-identify as atheists.4
In this paper, I propose to explore the epistemic significance of these 
results. Does it provide evidence in favor of theism? Should theists increase 
their confidence in the existence of God once they realize that they agree 
with a substantial majority of the most important philosophers who have 
ever lived? What is, in sum, the epistemic significance of agreement with 
those exceptional theistic philosophers? I begin by exploring some possi-
ble interconnections between the problem of disagreement as discussed in 
contemporary epistemology and the epistemic significance of agreement. 
If disagreement with an epistemic peer can provide evidence against our 
belief that p, then disagreement with an epistemic superior or authority 
or expert will even more obviously defeat (partially or totally) the justi-
fication we have for believing p. If so, disagreement with the most capa-
ble superiors or authorities on p should even more obviously provide us 
with defeaters for our belief that p. The converse should then also be true: 
agreement with an epistemic superior or authority should give us reasons 
(pro tanto and defeasible) for thinking that p is true. And that should be the 
case particularly if we are in agreement with the most capable epistemic 
superiors or authorities on a subject matter.
But can we think of exceptional philosophers of the past as epistemic 
superiors or authorities? I  will defend the view that the best way to 
articulate the intuition that those philosophers’ views can provide addi-
tional evidential support for our beliefs is in terms of the expert-as-advi-
sor model developed by Jennifer Lackey.5 I will also argue (call this “the 
main argument”) that the views of the most important philosophers of 
the past can provide evidential support in favor of certain propositions 
3We shall discuss the poll in more detail below.
4The number varies according to the poll we consider. More on this below.
5“Experts and Peer Disagreement.”
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when two conditions are satisfied: a majority of the most important phi-
losophers agree with us (or a supermajority, in the case of evidence that 
is, in and of itself, good enough for justified belief),6 and we have good 
reasons to think that progress has not been made toward discrediting the 
agreed proposition among contemporary experts on those views, toward 
making those views philosophically untenable among the philosophers 
specializing in them. I then argue that theism satisfies both conditions and 
that three other considerations reinforce the idea that agreement with the 
most important philosophers of all time with respect to theism7 provides 
additional evidential support for one’s theistic beliefs: the most impor-
tant philosophers disagreed on many philosophical questions, but agreed 
on theism; they constituted a very diverse group of thinkers (culturally, 
historically, and philosophically); and they were selected as the most 
important philosophers of all time by a majority of contemporary atheist 
philosophers. Finally, I raise some objections to the claim that such con-
siderations provide evidential support for theism and argue that one of 
them seems to partially undermine the evidential force of the main argu-
ment and of the three additional considerations. However, I  argue that 
this negative consideration is not strong enough to counterbalance the 
combined evidential force of all the positive considerations and that, as 
a result, agreement with exceptional theistic philosophers can provide at 
least some evidence in favor of theism.
1.  The Epistemic Significance of Agreement
Suppose that you are at a restaurant with a few friends and the waiter has 
brought the bill. You and a friend seated next to you and whom you know 
to be equally proficient in basic math are doing some mental calculation, 
trying to get to the amount that will be shared equally by all participants 
in the dinner. It turns out, you and your friend reach different results ($43 
and $41, respectively). Intuitively, the appropriate response is for both of 
you to significantly reduce confidence in the shares of the bill.8
6Some philosophers (e.g., Swinburne, Epistemic Justification; Hawthorne et al., “Belief is 
Weak”) take the threshold for justified belief to be anything above epistemic probability of .5 
(Hawthorne et al., 1394–1395, write: “merely thinking that a proposition is likely may entitle 
you to believe the proposition”). I believe that the correct threshold is higher than the one 
stipulated by these authors, though it is difficult to say how much higher. Thus, I am stipu-
lating that a supermajority is needed for evidence that is good enough, in and of itself, for 
justified theistic belief in this idealized scenario, and that a simple majority can confer some 
evidence, which, in the absence of additional sources of evidence in favor of theism, is not 
strong enough to justify theistic belief.
7In this paper, by “theism” I mean minimal theism (which I take to include generic classi-
cal theism, deism, polytheism, panentheism, and pantheism). Thanks to Mark Murphy for 
recommending this clarification.
8This is based on the famous Restaurant Check case, originally formulated by David 
Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement,” 193.
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When it comes to philosophical questions, however, unlike basic arith-
metic, things are more complicated. Philosophical views are, for the most 
part, not easily amenable to quantification. They often involve subtle con-
ceptual distinctions and not easily expressible insights. Reflecting on his 
conversations and correspondence with David Lewis on the problem of 
free will, Peter van Inwagen writes the following:
I am an incompatibilist and David was a compatibilist [. . .] I am convinced 
beyond all possibility of doubt that David understood perfectly all the argu-
ments for incompatibilism that I am aware of—and all other philosophical 
considerations relevant to the free-will problem [. . .] It seems difficult, there-
fore, to contend that, in this matter, he was in epistemic circumstances infe-
rior to mine [. . .] And one could hardly maintain that David was stupid or 
lacking in philosophical ability or that he labored under any other cognitive 
deficiency relevant to thinking about the problem of free will. (Not, at any 
rate, unless all human beings labor under this deficiency.) At the same time, 
I am unwilling to say that my own allegiance to incompatibilism is irrational. 
I can only conclude that I am rational in accepting incompatibilism and that 
David was rational in accepting compatibilism. And, therefore, we have at 
least one case in which one philosopher accepts a philosophical proposition 
and another accepts its denial and in which each is perfectly rational.9
In both cases, the disagreeing subjects share the same evidence, are 
equally capable of identifying and assessing the relevant information, 
and yet disagree. They recognize each other as peers—i.e., as sharing the 
same evidence and being equally capable in their assessment of that evi-
dence.10 Peer disagreement, however, is only one of the facets of the more 
general problem of disagreement. Another (related) problem involves 
disagreement with epistemic superiors or experts. Epistemic superiors 
are those who are better positioned than us to know something. Suppose 
that I believe that the capital of Turkey is Istanbul. I then meet a Turkish 
national who tells me that the capital of her country is actually Ankara. 
9“We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” 24–25.
10Unlike cases of disagreement about the sort of calculations described in the first case, 
which should compel significant reduction in confidence that one is right about her calcula-
tion, many philosophical disputes, such as the one described in the second case, have drawn 
different responses from philosophers working on this problem. One group of philosophers, 
known as steadfasters, and to which van Inwagen belongs, claim that reduction of confi-
dence in p is not necessary, at least not in many prominent cases of peer disagreement. The 
reason presented by steadfasters for this response varies according to different formulations 
of the steadfast view. Some, like van Inwagen, allege that confidence can be maintained due 
to the existence of private evidence or of a special incommunicable insight that the disagree-
ing party supposedly lacks. Others say that steadfast response to disagreement is justified 
due to the epistemic priority of the first-person perspective. Others, known as permissivists, 
claim that there may be more than one appropriate response to give to a body of evidence. 
Still others claim that confidence can be maintained when one has an error theory about 
why the other party reached a different conclusion on the basis of the same body of evi-
dence. The other group, known as conciliationists, defend the view that cases that configure 
peer disagreement compel reduction of confidence. This view is motivated by cases such as 
Restaurant Check.
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Since she is better positioned than me to know what the capital of her own 
country is—i.e., since she is my superior on this question—upon learning 
that she believes that the capital of Turkey is Ankara, I should adopt her 
belief. Experts, on the other hand, are the epistemic agents who, in virtue 
of their training and education, are more likely than non-experts to have 
true beliefs about (and perhaps know) things in their domain of expertise 
and to be able to contribute to the development (and perhaps progress) of 
their field of research through creative, innovative, and insightful reflec-
tion on the main problems and questions pertinent to it.11
But the problem of disagreement doesn’t seem to be restricted to disa-
greement with actual or living subjects, whether they are peers or supe-
riors. Suppose that a malevolent dictator has put to death all potential 
dissenters in his country. This means that there is no disagreement in that 
specific country with respect to certain propositions, such as that the dic-
tator is malevolent.12 But had the dictator not suppressed dissent, there 
would have been disagreement. If the appropriate response in cases of 
actual disagreement is conciliation with the disagreeing parties, then this 
may also be the appropriate response in cases, like the malevolent dicta-
tor, of possible disagreement. If so, then radical skepticism looms.13 But 
it seems implausible that all cases of possible disagreement should com-
pel significant reduction of confidence. It seems that what is key in dis-
tinguishing “benign” and “malign” cases of possible disagreement is the 
distinction between cases in which—to return to the malevolent dictator 
case—one has no reason to think that there might have been suppression 
of dissent versus cases in which one has reason to think that there might 
have been such suppression,14 and also between cases in which the pos-
sible disagreement provides actual evidence regarding p.15 In any case, 
suppose that one adds to this picture the information that the potential 
dissenters are not inferiors or even peers, but superiors or experts—per-
haps the most important thinkers in that specific area of inquiry who have 
11To be sure, while, in general, disagreement with superiors and even with experts should 
make us reduce our confidence in disputed matters, there are cases in which one may be 
justified in retaining belief and even perhaps the original degree of confidence in the target 
proposition despite the disagreement, such as when there is disagreement among the supe-
riors or experts, or when one has some sort of privileged access to evidence that the experts 
lack, or when one has an error theory that can account for the expert’s supposed inability to 
get things right.
12This is based on Thomas Kelly’s brief sketch of a similar case (“The Epistemic 
Significance of Disagreement,” 18). Kelly argues that cases of possible disagreement like this 
show that Conciliationism (see n.10) is untenable.
13See Matheson and Carey, “How Skeptical Is the Equal Weight View?” for a conciliation-
ist response to the problem of possible disagreement.
14See Barnett and Li, “Conciliationism and Merely Possible Disagreement,” for an 
attempt to distinguish problematic from unproblematic cases of possible disagreement along 
these lines.
15See Bryan Frances, “The Reflective Epistemic Renegade,” for a distinction along 
these lines.
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ever lived. This seems to increase the pressure one would have to reduce 
confidence in the target proposition in malign cases.
In sum, disagreement often provides reasons (pro tanto and defea-
sible) for reduction of one’s confidence in a given target proposition. 
This is especially obvious with respect to disagreement with superiors, 
authorities, and experts. But it is plausible to think that not all cases of 
epistemically relevant disagreement are actual. Perhaps possible disagree-
ment, and perhaps disagreement with thinkers who are no longer alive, 
for instance, should also generate pressure for reduction of confidence in 
p. Conversely, it seems natural to think that, if disagreement with peers 
can provide evidence against the justification and perhaps the truth of 
our beliefs, then agreement with peers can give us additional evidence 
in favor of our beliefs.16 Likewise, if disagreement with superiors has, all 
else being equal, greater evidential value than disagreement with peers, 
then agreement with superiors should be, all else remaining equal, more 
evidentially relevant to my beliefs than agreement with peers. And the 
same can plausibly be said with respect to expectation of agreement with 
possible and counterfactual interlocutors, especially if those interlocutors 
are experts and perhaps the most important interlocutors in a particular 
area of inquiry who have ever lived.
However, agreement in philosophy can be quite elusive. There is phil-
osophical disagreement about nearly everything. And even when we can 
find some agreement among philosophers, it rarely amounts to consensus. 
That said, not all philosophical questions are equally controversial. In fact, 
to many questions, we can find a majority or vast majority of philoso-
phers agreeing on specific answers. While some philosophers believe, for 
instance, that we can’t know much about the external world or even about 
ourselves, the vast majority of philosophers have agreed that much of what 
we take ourselves to know is in fact known by us. According to a survey 
conducted by Bourget and Chalmers17 on contemporary philosophers’ 
16The idea that we ought to increase confidence that p upon discovering that a peer 
also believes p with similar degree of confidence is illustrated by the following case by 
Christensen:
Suppose, for example, that I am a doctor determining what dosage of a drug to give 
my patient. I’m initially inclined to be very confident in my conclusion, but knowing 
my own fallibility in calculation, I pull back a bit, say, to 0.97. I also decide to ask my 
equally qualified colleague for an independent opinion. I do so in the conciliatory 
spirit of using her reasoning as a check on my own. Now suppose I  find out that 
she has arrived—presumably in a way that also takes into account her fallibility—at 
0.96 credence in the same dosage. Here, it seems that the rational thing to do is for 
me to increase my confidence that this is the correct dosage, not decrease it as differ-
ence-splitting would require. But this is not inconsistent with giving equal weight to 
my colleague’s opinion (“Disagreement as Evidence,” 759).
See Easwaran et al., “Updating on the Credences of Others,” for a formalization of this 
idea, which they call synergy.
17“What Do Philosophers Believe?”
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views on a variety of philosophical questions, 81.6% of the philosophers 
surveyed consider themselves non-skeptical realists, 75.1% are scientific 
realists, and 65.7% are cognitivists about moral judgment (to mention just 
a few results in which they found substantial agreement). They found, 
however, that philosophers are sharply divided when it comes to many 
other questions, such as the nature of abstract objects and of epistemic 
justification.18 Disagreement among experts may be thought to undermine 
the trustworthiness of those same experts in the cases in which they reach 
consensus. This seems to be a false assumption, however. Finnur Dellsén,19 
for instance, has argued, on the basis of three frameworks for non-deduc-
tive reasoning, that disagreement among experts actually increases the 
probability that they are correct when they reach consensus on a given 
topic.20 In sum, agreement is elusive in philosophy, and consensus is very 
rare. Thus, when we discover that philosophers who frequently disagree 
reach a consensus or form a majority or supermajority opinion on a certain 
topic, we gain reasons (pro tanto and defeasible) for thinking that their 
opinion on such a topic is epistemically justified and/or true.21 And that 
should also be the case with respect to possible and actual but non-con-
temporary or counterfactual philosophers, as well as non-contemporary 
or counterfactual experts.
2.  Counterfactual Epistemic Superiors and Experts
Some philosophers (e.g., Zagzebski22) understand epistemic authority in 
terms of preemption: if we have reasons to think that someone is better 
than us at getting at the truth of a particular question, we should defer to 
that person’s (i.e., the authority’s) views. The authority’s views should not 
be seen as an additional piece of evidence that should be weighted with 
other evidence. If we treated the authority’s views as simply additional 
pieces of evidence, we would be worse-off with respect to our goal of get-
ting the truth. Epistemically speaking, then, it would be far better for us to 
simply and wholly defer to an authority who has a better track record in 
getting the truth in a specific domain.
18When it comes to abstract objects, 39.3% are Platonists, 37.7% are nominalists, and 23.0% 
answered “other.” With respect to epistemic justification, 42.7% endorse externalism, 26.4%, 
internalism, and 30.8% responded “other.”
19“When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.”
20More on this below.
21A majority might suffice to provide some evidential support for p, but a supermajority 
would be necessary for evidence that is good, in and of itself, to justify belief (see note 6). The 
principle I have in mind here is similar to Bryan Frances’s Controversy Rule:
If you have controversial belief B, you become convinced that lots of intelligent peo-
ple believe not-B (where you believe that some of these people are your peers while 
others are your superiors or inferiors), but you also come to think that the experts 
taken as a large group definitely agree with you by a significant majority, then you are 
reasonable if you retain your belief B. (Disagreement, 88–9)
22Epistemic Authority.
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A major problem with such views about epistemic authority, however, 
is that, in many, if not most, domains, we often find experts disagreeing 
among themselves. In light of this and other problems with preemption 
views of epistemic authority,23 Jennifer Lackey24 has proposed an alterna-
tive model: the experts-as-advisor model. On Lackey’s view, the testimony 
of the expert does not give us preemptive reasons; rather, it provides us 
with evidence that offers us guidance in the formation of our beliefs. She 
illustrates the advantages of her model with the deliberations in a trial 
where experts are summoned to the courtroom to give expert testimony 
on some forensic question. Rather than providing preemptive reasons, the 
testimony of experts provide evidence in favor or against certain hypoth-
eses. “Indeed,” notes Lackey, “jurors themselves would be superfluous 
in many ways if experts functioned authoritatively.” And she concludes: 
“The experts are here, then, advising the jurors rather than dictating to 
them what they ought to believe.”25
I want to suggest that the epistemic significance of agreement with the 
most important philosophers of all time is similar to the epistemic sig-
nificance of agreement with experts brought to a courtroom to testify on 
contentious matters regarding which there may not be consensus among 
the experts themselves. Their expert opinions are not authoritative in 
the sense envisioned by preemption theorists, in which they preempt all 
other reasons we may have. Rather, they offer us guidance. Agreement 
with their views provide us with evidence in favor of our views. A cru-
cial difference between the trial scenario and the one involving the most 
important philosophers of the past, however, is that we are not talking 
about living superiors who will be aware of all the contemporary relevant 
evidence, debates, and arguments for and against p. So I suggest that we 
should think of the epistemic significance of agreement with the greatest 
philosophers who have ever lived in counterfactual terms, as illustrated 
by the following thought experiment:
Imagine that time travel is possible—logically, metaphysically, and phys-
ically possible—and that a time machine that can effectively take humans 
to the past and then bring them back to the future has been built. Imagine 
further that time travel journeys have been organized to Ancient Greece, 
Medieval France, Modern France, Modern Germany, Modern England, and 
1940s England to try to bring back to the future the greatest philosophical 
minds who have ever lived so that they can stay together for some time 
studying the more recent philosophical developments on the question of 
God’s existence and in philosophical and formal logic and discussing such 
question among each other and with contemporary philosophers. After 
much planning and preparation, the operation is successful and we have 
23For discussion of other problems with the authority or preemption view, see, among 
others, Lackey, “Experts and Peer Disagreement.”
24“Experts and Peer Disagreement.”
25“Experts and Peer Disagreement,” 239.
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been able to bring26 Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, 
Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the present. After a year, these 
philosophers have been able to learn everything that is philosophically rel-
evant with respect to the God question in the history of philosophy and 
in contemporary philosophy and the most relevant developments in philo-
sophical and formal logic of the past one hundred or so years.
In this thought experiment, the most important philosophers of the past 
are, at a minimum, the peers of contemporary philosophers of religion 
when it comes to the evidence regarding theism and philosophical rea-
soning abilities. But they are, arguably, also superiors to them when it 
comes to philosophical creativity, innovativeness, and insight. As we saw 
above, possible philosophers, and possible experts in particular, can plau-
sibly give us evidence in favor or against our views. Our philosophers 
here are not possible philosophers, however—they are real philosophers 
who held concrete views about a large number of philosophical questions 
but who are simply no longer alive. Thus, we shouldn’t identify them as 
possible philosophers, but as non-contemporary actual philosophers, or, 
to use Nathan Ballantyne’s expression, “counterfactual philosophers.”27 
And they cannot be considered experts tout court, for they are not here, 
now, aware of all relevant arguments for and against the existence of God. 
Nevertheless, it seems that we can reach a conclusion as to whether they 
would likely change or retain their original views with respect to the exist-
ence of God as a philosophical question. How so? We have to think of their 
original views regarding p and suppose that they have learned about the 
main philosophical developments of the past decades or centuries regard-
ing p. With this in mind, the crucial question is: Have such developments 
rendered theistic beliefs philosophically untenable? Has the philosophical 
debate with respect to the existence of God of the past decades or centuries 
shown conclusively that theistic belief is false or unjustified? Have new 
strong arguments against the existence of God or against the rationality 
of theistic belief emerged and proven to be successful whereas the same 
cannot be said with respect to new arguments in favor of the existence of 
God or against the rationality of theistic belief?
Therefore, I propose that, when assessing whether agreement with the 
views of a specific group of non-contemporary philosophers should give 
26This is the list of exceptional philosophers that resulted from the poll conducted by 
Brian Leiter, “The Most Important Western Philosophers of All Time,” with over one thou-
sand participants on who are the most important philosophers of all time.
27Counterfactual philosophers are “those who could have been working among us now 
but are not” (Ballantyne, “Counterfactual Philosophers,” 368). The “problem of counterfac-
tual philosophers,” as formulated by Ballantyne, is a skeptical problem, in that we should 
expect our philosophical views to be criticized (and probably defeated) by competent coun-
terfactual philosophers were they working among us. I believe the problem with this for-
mulation is that it looks only at one side of the problem, for we could have reasons to think 
that counterfactual philosophers (perhaps the majority of them or at least of the best or most 
important of them) would agree with us on certain topics, thus providing additional eviden-
tial support for some of our beliefs.
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us evidence in favor of our views, we should ascertain whether two con-
ditions are satisfied:
(a)The most important philosophers of the past (or a majority of them) held 
views about p that were the same or close approximations to mine.
(b)The conclusions reached by those exceptional philosophers regarding 
p have not been shown to be implausible among those specializing today on 
p and related questions.
The answers to specific philosophical questions given by the most impor-
tant philosophers of the past might have been original and significant dec-
ades, centuries, and even millennia ago. But since then much philosophical 
debate and argumentation on those questions may have come to light, and 
perhaps conclusively shown that the views or arguments of our exceptional 
philosophers are likely to be irremediably flawed, so much so that our 
exceptional philosophers, were they to travel to the present (as in our time 
travel thought experiment), would change their minds with respect to their 
views. In sum, my claim is that, supposing that we find philosophical views 
that satisfy the conditions (a) and (b), we have gained evidence in favor of 
those views. If both conditions are satisfied we can claim that the opinion 
of exceptional philosophers of the past regarding p provides at least some 
evidential support for p. If (a) is satisfied, we know which view with respect 
to a certain philosophical question can be supported by the authoritative 
or expert opinion of great philosophers of the past. But we also need (b) in 
order to characterize such philosophers as counterfactual peers or experts 
on p—i.e., so that they are not only our superiors with respect to philosoph-
ical creativity, innovativeness, and insight, but also our peers with respect to 
the relevant evidence and philosophical reasoning abilities.28
3.  The Epistemic Significance of Agreement with Exceptional Counterfactual 
Theistic Philosophers
Who were the ten most important philosophers of all time? It might be dif-
ficult to find two philosophers who agree on the same list of great philoso-
phers of the past. Hence, it seems that the best way to proceed here would 
be by polling contemporary philosophers on whom they think were the 
28In our thought experiment, the most important philosophers of all time would be trans-
ported to the present and would learn everything that is relevant to the God question in the 
history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy. They would also learn all the devel-
opments in philosophical and formal logic of the past one hundred or so years relevant for 
current philosophical practice. They would, therefore, become peers of contemporary philoso-
phers when it comes to evidence and the logical skills, but would, arguably, be superior to them 
when it comes to other philosophical abilities that have proven to be crucially important for 
progress in philosophy, such as creativity, innovativeness, and insight. Great philosophers of the 
past were often susceptible to making logical mistakes that well-trained philosophers today are 
unlikely to make (For instance, John Earman contends that David Hume’s arguments against 
miracles reveal “the weakness and the poverty of Hume’s own account of induction and prob-
abilistic reasoning” (Hume’s Abject Failure, 3)), thus the importance of adding the idea that our 
time travelers would learn the more recent developments in philosophical reasoning and logic.
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most important or best philosophers of all time.29 The closest thing we have 
to such a poll is the one conducted by Brian Leiter. In 2017, he invited read-
ers of his blog, whose target audience is academic philosophers, to cast their 
votes for the “most important western philosophers of all time.” With 1160 











As mentioned above, a significant majority of the contemporary philoso-
phers who participated in Bourget and Chalmers’s survey31 self-identified as 
atheists. More precisely, 72% claimed to be atheists, whereas 14% self-iden-
tified as theists, 12% as other, and 5% percent as agnostics.32 Another survey, 
29Of course, this is also a precarious method for the selection of the most important or best 
philosophers, for contemporary philosophers are likely to reflect to some extent some of the 
biases or widely held presuppositions of the contemporary philosophical and academic cul-
tures. For instance, if atheism (or theism) is predominant among contemporary philosophers 
and perhaps academics in general, all else remaining equal, we should expect contemporary 
philosophers to favor philosophers who held atheistic (or theistic) views when casting their 
votes in a poll designed to select the most important philosophers of all time. However, 
contrary to such expectations, although atheism is predominant today among philosophers 
and academics in general, the vast majority of the most important philosophers of all time 
selected by contemporary philosophers were theists. This, I contend, should be seen as addi-
tional evidence in favor of theism, even if only a modest one. More on this below.











31“What Do Philosophers Believe?”
32Their survey was conducted in 2009 and included a target sample of 1,972 philosophers 
from 99 leading departments of philosophy in North America, the UK, Continental Europe and 
Australasia, and invited all users of the philpapers.org website to answer questions such as:
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
God: Theism or Atheism?
In total, 3,226 individuals completed the survey, including 931 of the 1,972 members of 
the target faculty group.
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conducted by Helen De Cruz, found a different result: 25% of the partici-
pants self-identified as theists, 50% as atheists, 16% as agnostics, and 8% as 
“other.”33 Either way, if the distribution of religious beliefs among the par-
ticipants in Leiter’s poll reflect the distribution found in either Bourget and 
Chalmers’s survey or in De Cruz’s, we have the result that a much larger 
proportion of atheist—compared to theist—philosophers participated in 
the poll. We don’t know if this proportion holds in the poll, but it seems a 
fair assumption,34 and this suggests that the list of the most important phi-
losophers that resulted from Leiter’s poll was selected by a larger number of 
atheist philosophers than of theist philosophers. It is important to mention 
this given that the vast majority of the selected philosophers were theists. 
None of the philosophers in our list were obviously atheists or agnostics. 
Thus, the condition (a) stipulated in the last section seems to have been eas-
ily satisfied:
• Classical theists: Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Kant (total: 5)
• Non-classical theists: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle (total: 3)
• Unclear/ambiguous: Hume, Wittgenstein (total: 2)
• Agnostic: None
• Atheist: None
And what about condition (b)? A good starting point in evaluating con-
dition (b) is to look at surveys such as Bourget and Chalmers’s and De 
Cruz’s. Note that the disparity between the two surveys when it comes to 
the proportion of atheistic and theistic believers among academic philos-
ophers can be partially explained by the fact that Bourget and Chalmers’s 
survey concentrated on leading departments, in particular at research uni-
versities. This excluded philosophers teaching at non-research religious 
institutions (universities, colleges, and seminaries) from their sample. 
This is likely to have resulted in the exclusion of a large portion of theistic 
philosophers (many of whom are likely to have a preference for work-
ing at religious institutions).35 In any case, a more reliable indicator of the 
degree to which theism is a viable option among contemporary philoso-
phers is the extent to which those working in philosophy of religion are 
theists. Philosophers of religion are, in general, more familiar with current 
philosophical developments regarding the rationality of theistic beliefs. 
33De Cruz recruited 518 academic philosophers to complete an online survey, mostly from 
the English-speaking world, and with different philosophical specializations.
34In fact, we have good reasons to think that the percentage of philosophers who partici-
pated in the poll who self-identify as atheists was higher than the one we find in the general 
philosophical population. See n. 44.
35Think here, as an illustration, of Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga famously went initially to 
Harvard as an undergraduate on a full scholarship, but decided to drop out after his first year 
and complete his degree at Calvin College, a small college from his religious denomination. 
Plantinga ended up (after completing his Ph.D. at Yale and briefly teaching at Wayne State 
University) teaching at Calvin and, later, at the University of Notre Dame (two Christian 
institutions) for the rest of his career. It is plausible to think that many theistic philosophers 
will, like Plantinga, choose to teach at religious institutions.
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They are more familiar with the arguments for and against theism and, 
should the current debate on the rationality of theistic beliefs be unfavora-
ble to theism, we shouldn’t expect the number of theistic philosophers to 
be particularly high. We should also expect the number of theists entering 
the profession to be significantly higher than the number of philosophers 
of religion who are already well-established in the profession. However, 
these expectations are not corroborated by the available evidence. De 
Cruz found a significant “correlation between theism and philosophy of 
religion as an area of specialization.” Sixty percent of philosophers of reli-
gion self-identified as theists, and only 22.7% and 6.7% self-identified as 
atheists and agnostics, respectively,36 whereas the number of theists, athe-
ists, and agnostics among philosophers in general are 25%, 50%, and 16%, 
respectively. Moreover, “most respondents,” she writes, “did not report a 
change in their religious beliefs—only 17.6% had experienced a significant 
change in religious outlook since graduate school.”37
De Cruz concludes from this that such a “high representation of theists 
in philosophy of religion is probably a result of self-selection.”38 Those 
numbers, however, can also be reasonably interpreted as indicating that 
philosophers of religion who are religious have not found much reason to 
give up their religious beliefs in light of the contemporary developments 
in their area of specialization. But perhaps, an objector could claim, the 
predominance of theists working in philosophy of religion can produce 
a distortion in the philosophical debate in this area. Since the atheistic 
side is not well represented in the profession, this may have the effect of 
making the theistic side look stronger than it actually is. This is certainly 
a legitimate concern, but we should be careful not to exaggerate it. There 
certainly is a large number of talented atheist and agnostic philosophers 
working in philosophy of religion today and they have been able to raise 
new challenges to the rationality and truth of theistic beliefs: new ver-
sions of the immemorial argument from evil, and formulations of related 
arguments, such as the argument from divine hiddenness, as well as more 
general epistemological problems that have seen growing application to 
the epistemology of religious belief, such as the problem of disagreement. 
These arguments, however, have been met with a variety of interesting 
and creative responses. And a plethora of new arguments for the exist-
ence of God and for the rationality of religious beliefs apart from natural 
theology arguments have emerged in the past five or so decades. During 
this period, it is safe to say, there has been unparalleled growth in the 
field of philosophy of religion in the analytical tradition. The work of phi-
losophers such as Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, William Alston, 
Robert M. Adams, and Peter van Inwagen, to name a few, gave new life 
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and defending theistic belief. And today, a new generation of major the-
istic philosophers, such as Brian Leftow, Alexander Pruss, Lara Buchak, 
Dean Zimmermann, Linda Zagzebski, Eleonore Stump, C. S. Evans, John 
Hare, John Greco, Michael Bergmann, Robert Koons, Jonathan Kvanvig, 
Timothy and Lydia McGrew, Mark Murphy, Timothy O’Connor, Paul 
K. Moser, Daniel Bonevac, Trenton Merricks, and many others, has carried 
on the work of the previous generation.39 If anything, theistic philosophy 
is much stronger today than it was fifty years ago and probably stronger 
than at any time since Late Modernity. Brian Leftow40 goes as far as to 
say that, while the post-WWII expansion of university faculties ensued a 
golden age in analytic philosophy, it is possible to say that, in philosophy 
of religion, the age has been platinum, given the progress that has been 
made in this discipline.
Roderick Chisholm was interviewed in 1980 for a cover story by Time 
magazine about the renaissance of theistic philosophy that was noticea-
ble in those days and testified to this transformation of the philosophical 
landscape:
A generation ago, atheistic empiricists like Harvard’s Willard V.  Quine 
were influential simply because “they were the brightest people,” says 
Philosophy Professor Roderick Chisholm of Brown University, adding that 
now the “brightest people include theists, using a kind of tough-minded 
intellectualism” that was often lacking on their side of the debate.41
Twenty-one years later, atheist philosopher Quentin Smith lamented what 
he perceived as a process of desecularization of analytic philosophy:
The secularization of mainstream academia began to quickly unravel upon 
the publication of Plantinga’s influential book, God and Other Minds, in 1967. 
It became apparent to the philosophical profession that this book displayed 
that realist theists were not outmatched by naturalists in terms of the most 
valued standards of analytic philosophy: conceptual precision, rigor of 
argumentation, technical erudition, and an in-depth defense of an original 
world-view. This book, followed seven years later by Plantinga’s even more 
impressive book, The Nature of Necessity, made it manifest that a realist theist 
was writing at the highest qualitative level of analytic philosophy, on the 
same playing field as Carnap, Russell, Moore, Grünbaum, and other natu-
ralists [. . .] Naturalists passively watched as realist versions of theism, most 
influenced by Plantinga’s writings, began to sweep through the philosophi-
cal community, until today perhaps one-quarter or one-third of philosophy 
professors are theists, with most being orthodox Christians [. . .] [In] philos-
ophy, it became, almost overnight, “academically respectable” to argue for 
39If our list were to include not only theistic philosophers working in philosophy of 
religion, but also theistic philosophers who had little interest (at least as revealed by their 
published work) in philosophy of religion, we could add to it other major contemporary 
philosophers such as Michael Dummett, Bas van Fraasen, Nicholas Rescher, Hilary Putnam, 
and Saul Kripke.
40“Whither Philosophy of Religion?”
41“Modernizing the Case for God.”
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theism, making philosophy a favored field of entry for the most intelligent 
and talented theists entering academia today [. . .] God is not “dead” in aca-
demia; he returned to life in the late 1960s and is now alive and well in his 
last academic stronghold, philosophy departments.42
As a result, we have good reasons to think that non-contemporary excep-
tional theistic philosophers would find the current landscape of philoso-
phy of religion quite receptive to their theistic beliefs. Perhaps they would 
be impressed by new arguments against the existence of God and the 
rationality of theistic beliefs. But, given that theistic philosophy has fared 
so well in the past few decades, given the rigor and creativity that charac-
terizes much of the current defenses of the rationality and truth of theism, 
we have good grounds to think that they would, more likely than not, 
retain their theistic beliefs.
Therefore, the epistemic significance of these findings seems to lend 
support to the intuition that agreement with the most important philos-
ophers of all time can give us evidence in favor of the beliefs we share 
with them. Once we realize that (i) a majority, and perhaps even a super-
majority, of the most important philosophers of all time agreed with us 
on p,43 that (ii) these philosophers were distributed in different cultural 
and intellectual environments, spanning over two millennia (showing 
thus the pervasiveness and persistence of such beliefs among exceptional 
philosophers), that (iii) they disagreed on so many questions, but agreed 
on p, that (iv) they were selected as the most important philosophers by 
a majority of philosophers who believed ¬p, and that (v) contemporary 
philosophical debate regarding p has not in any obvious way discredited 
belief that p, we have gained additional reasons to believe that p is true. 
Theistic beliefs seem to satisfy these conditions. Theistic beliefs were held 
by a substantial majority of the most important philosophers who have 
ever lived (supposing Leiter’s poll is a reliable source of information about 
who were the most important). They were distributed in different cultural 
and intellectual environments, spanning over two millennia, comprising 
the Ancient world, the Middle Ages, and the Modern and Contemporary 
42“The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” 2–3.
43Our main argument may be thought to resemble the theistic argument from common 
consent. According to the classical versions of the argument, beliefs that are universal or 
nearly so should be taken to be true. In a more recent (and more plausible) formulation of 
the argument, Thomas Kelly (“Consensus Gentium”) has claimed that the datum that a strong 
supermajority of humans believes that God exists can provide evidence in favor of theism if 
the best explanation of this datum is God’s existence. A main difficulty with common con-
sent arguments in general is that its success seems to depend on the consensus being reached 
independently by the individuals that form the population in question. Kelly contends that 
this may be a problem for theistic versions of the argument, since, according to him, it is not 
entirely clear that such independence can be observed in the way that theistic beliefs are 
ordinarily formed. This alleged problem does not seem to affect our main argument from 
counterfactual exceptional philosophers, since most of those philosophers offered independ-
ent reasons for their theistic beliefs. In addition, the success of our main argument does not 
depend on the opinions of the world’s population regarding theism.
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worlds. They disagreed on many other philosophical questions, but a sig-
nificant majority of them agreed on theism. They were selected as the most 
important philosophers of all time by a majority of atheist philosophers.44 
And we have good reasons to think that such philosophers, were they 
here among us, would find a philosophical landscape that is quite recep-
tive to their theistic beliefs. Consequently, we should agree that agree-
ment with those exceptional theistic philosophers does seem to constitute 
evidence in favor of theism.
4.  A Reference Class Problem?
So far, our main argument has been relying on polling data concerning the 
views of the top ten philosophers of all time. But there is something arti-
ficial about our focus on the ten most important philosophers. Leiter him-
self reports the result of his poll by presenting a list of the 32 top choices 
among the poll participants, and it is possible that this larger sample of 
philosophers could prove to be less epistemically favorable to theism.
Besides the ten philosophers who have already been mentioned, 
the other philosophers represented in Leiter’s top 32 list are: Hobbes, 
Marx, J. S. Mill, Spinoza, Augustine, Frege, Hegel, Nietzsche, B. Russell, 
Kierkegaard, Berkeley, Quine, Epicurus, Rousseau, Kripke, Rawls, 
Carnap, Bacon, Bentham, D. K. Lewis, Democritus, and Heraclitus. And 
once we identify these philosophers’s views regarding theism, we find 
that the poll’s results continue to be far more epistemically favorable to 
theism than to non-theism. In this new reference class, the number of phi-
losophers who can be classified as atheists or agnostics increases from 0 
(in the top 10 reference class) to 9 (in the top 32 reference class), while 
the representativeness of theism increases from 8 to 18, and the unclear/
ambiguous group increases from 2 to 5. Thus, on this broader reference 
class, theism is represented by 66% of philosophers, and non-theism by 
44%, still a supermajority.
However, this way of thinking about the epistemic significance of 
those philosophers’ beliefs with respect to theism is misleading. It treats 
the beliefs of the philosophers at the top and at the bottom of the list as 
having equal evidential value. A  still precarious but nonetheless more 
accurate way of representing the epistemic significance of the opinions of 
the broadened reference class vis-à-vis theism is to assign scores to each 
philosopher proportional to the position they occupy in the list. If we sub-
tract, for instance, .25 from their scores as we move from top to bottom, we 
find that theism far outweighs non-theism (73% to 27%). And if we restrict 
44In fact, given that Brian Leiter is an outspoken atheist and that he occasionally posts 
comments critical of religion on his blog, we should expect his audience (and thus the par-
ticipants in his polls) to be disproportionately composed of atheist philosophers. Conversely, 
were Leiter an outspoken theist who occasionally posted comments critical of atheism, 
we should expect his audience to have a lower proportion of atheist philosophers than it 
actually has.
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the non-theistic group solely to atheism and agnosticism, we find that the 
gap between these two positions widens to 79%–21%. As a result, even if 
we broaden our reference class, theism continues to have a supermajority 
among the most important philosophers of all time.
Let us call classical theism “CT,” other varieties of minimal theism 
(including deism, polytheism, panentheism, and pantheism) “OT,” unclear 
or ambiguous views “U/A,” agnosticism “Ag,” and atheism “At.” And let us 
assign a score of 10 to the philosopher who received the largest number of 
votes in the poll and proceed by assigning to each of the remaining philos-
ophers a score that is 0.25 lower than the one of the previous philosopher:
1. Aristotle (OT) (10) 17. Hegel (OT) (6)
2. Plato (OT) (9.75) 18. Nietzsche (At) (5.75)
3. Kant (CT) (9.5) 19. B. Russell (At) (5.5)
4. Hume (U/A) (9.25) 20. Kierkegaard (CT) (5.25)
5. Descartes (CT) (9) 21. Berkeley (CT) (5)
6. Socrates (OT) (8.75) 22. Quine (At) (4.75)
7. Locke (CT) (8.5) 23. Epicurus (OT) (4.5)
8. Wittgenstein (U/A) (8.25) 24. Rousseau (OT) (4.25)
9. Aquinas (CT) (8) 25. Kripke (CT) (4)
10. Leibniz (CT) (7.75) 26. Rawls (Ag) (3.75)
11. Hobbes (OT) (7.5) 27. Carnap (At) (3.5)
12. Marx (At) (7.25) 28. Bacon (CT) (3.25)
13. J.S. Mill (Ag) (7) 29. Bentham (At) (3)
14. Spinoza (U/A) (6.75) 30. D.K. Lewis (At) (2.75)
15. Augustine (CT) (6.5) 31. Democritus (U/A) (2.5)
16. Frege (U/A) (6.25) 32. Heraclitus (OT) (2.25)
Call now “COT” the conjunction of CT and OT and “AA” the conjunc-
tion of Ag and At. As already mentioned, we find in the top 32 list of phi-
losophers 18 COTs, 9 AAs, and 5 U/As. In terms of percentages, 56% are 
COTs, 28% are AAs, and 16% are U/As. If we exclude U/As, we find that 
66% are COTs and 44% are AAs. If we exclude U/As and agnostics from 
AAs, we have 72% COTs and 28% atheists. In terms of scores, COTs scored 
119.75, AAs scored 43.25, and U/As, 32.75. COTs have accumulated 61% 
percent of the total score (COTs + AAs + U/As), whereas AAs have 22%, 
and U/As have 17%. If we exclude U/As, COTs have 73% of the total score 
and AAs have 27%. If, on the other hand, we exclude the scores of U/As 
and of agnostics, COTs have 79% of the total score and atheists have 21%.
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5.  Importance vs. Greatness
One potential constraint on the evidential significance of the main argument 
is that the question that was presented to the participants of the poll under 
consideration was “who were the most important philosophers of all time,” 
instead of who were the “best” or the “greatest” ones. The reason why the 
actual formulation of the poll question might be thought to pose a problem 
for the main argument is that “importance” seems to be a notion more tenu-
ously associated with epistemic virtues and achievements than “greatness.”
However, there are reasons to doubt that the poll’s focus on “impor-
tance,” rather than “greatness,” would undermine the main argument. 
Would the vast majority of the participants have voted differently had 
the title of the poll been “the greatest philosophers of all time?” Would 
they have selected different philosophers, or selected the philosophers 
they actually did but in a different order? Even if their selections had been 
different, it is not obvious that such difference would have been detri-
mental to our results. In fact, it may well be the case that the locution 
“most important” contributed to elicit a less subjective and idiosyncratic 
response from poll participants than it would have been the case in the 
“best” and “greatest” formulations. If we are asked “which were the best 
presidents (or prime ministers) in your country’s history?,” we are likely to 
exhibit a certain bias toward selecting presidents (or prime ministers) who 
belonged to the political party that we are more inclined to support today 
or who implemented policies that are more similar to the policies that we 
favor today. On the other hand, if we are asked “who were the most impor-
tant presidents (or prime ministers) in your country’s history?,” we are, it 
seems to me, more likely to take a step back and search for an answer that 
is less likely to be affected by personal preferences. Thus, by being asked 
the question in the “most important” formulation, the participants may 
have refrained from expressing their views in a more subjective manner.
Nevertheless, despite these reasons against the conjecture that the poll 
results would have been significantly different in the “best” and “great-
est” formulations, we cannot completely rule this out. Hence, I suggest that 
we should think of this consideration as undermining to some extent the 
total evidential value of the main argument. However, I believe that this 
negative consideration is not strong enough to significantly undermine its 
evidential value, let alone the combined evidential force of the five positive 
factors mentioned at the end of section 3. We have explored (i) and (v) (i.e., 
the main argument) at length, and (iv) was discussed in notes 29, 34, and 
44. So let us conclude this section by saying something about (ii) and (iii).
The fact that the most important philosophers of all time constitute 
a very diverse group of thinkers (culturally, historically, and philosoph-
ically), who disagreed on many things, makes it more likely that the 
things on which they agreed are true. As mentioned previously, Dellsén45 
argued, on the basis of three frameworks for non-deductive reasoning 
45“When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.”
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(Bayesianism, inference to the best explanation, and robustness analy-
sis), that when experts reach a strong agreement on a certain view in a 
domain marked by disagreement, this counts positively in favor of the 
agreed view. Here is a brief summary of how Dellsén argues for this the-
sis using his inference to the best explanation framework. We know that 
human beings often agree and reach consensus on certain propositions 
not because of critical evaluation of evidence, but because of crowed psy-
chology. Upon discovering that group G has reached a consensus on p1, 
how can we know whether such a consensus was reached on the basis 
of critical evaluation of evidence or of crowed psychology? One way to 
gain evidence regarding which of these belief-formation methods was 
employed in the formation of consensus is by detecting G members’ views 
regarding other propositions or theories. If we find that G reached a con-
sensus on p1, but its members disagreed on p2 and p3, which of these two 
belief-formation methods best explains this disparity? If G members were 
forming their beliefs regarding domain-p theories on the basis of crowed 
psychology, we should expect them to mostly agree not only on p1, but 
also on p2 and p3. On the critical evaluation of evidence hypothesis, how-
ever, disagreement on p2 and p3 can be explained by the inconclusiveness 
of the evidence available pertaining to p2 and p3. Therefore, critical evalua-
tion of evidence has greater explanatory power than crowed psychology.46 
As a result, once we discover that G members, who agree on p1, disagree 
on p2 and p3, we have gained evidence that G’s views regarding p1 are 
epistemically justified, and, hence, we have gained evidence in favor of p1.
Our exceptional counterfactual philosophers disagreed on many 
things—on the nature of knowledge, on free will, on the best way to organ-
ize a society politically, and so on—but they (or the vast majority of them) 
agreed on theism. Moreover, they constitute a very diverse group of think-
ers—culturally, historically, and philosophically. And despite this diversity, 
they mostly agreed that theism is true. These considerations, I am suggest-
ing, support the critical evaluation of evidence hypothesis with respect 
to our exceptional theistic philosophers and, thus, constitute evidence in 
favor of theism. (i) to (v), then, can give us a great deal of evidence in favor 
of theism. Some of this evidence may be counterbalanced by the consider-
ation about the distinction between “importance” and “greatness” and the 
reliance of the poll on the former concept. However, it seems to me that this 
negative consideration is not nearly strong enough to completely counter-
balance the cumulative evidential value of the positive factors.
6.  Can Philosophers Be Experts on Theism?
There are two (related) additional potential difficulties with the idea that 
the views of other philosophers can be evidentially significant when it 
comes to theism. First, why think that there are experts on religious 
46Dellsén argues that the critical evaluation hypothesis is also simpler when the crowed 
psychology hypothesis is modified to increase its explanatory power.
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matters, and on theism in particular? And, secondly, even if there are 
experts on theism, what makes us think that philosophers are the sort of 
people who can be considered experts on God? It is in fact plausible to 
think that, if theism is true, philosophers are not the right sort of people to 
be regarded as experts on theism, especially if the true version of theism 
is to be found within the Abrahamic tradition (Christianity, or Judaism, 
or perhaps Islamism). These religions seem to posit moral constraints on 
our access to God and to emphasize the role of private, experiential evi-
dence in our coming to know God. If this is so, then it seems doubtful that 
theistic evidence and knowledge could be gained purely on the basis of 
philosophical inquiry, irrespective of moral considerations and of one’s 
private, experiential contact with the divine reality.
So, first, can there be religious experts? Some philosophers think that 
the idea that there are experts on morality and on religion is problematic.47 
And even if there are experts on theism, why think that philosophers can 
fulfill this role? Perhaps the right sort people to be regarded as experts 
on God are religious or spiritual leaders or authorities. In particular, if 
theism is true and the true version of theism is one of the varieties of the 
Abrahamic religions, then perhaps we should expect God to be selec-
tive in the way he provides evidence of his existence to humans. Blaise 
Pascal famously drew a distinction between the God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, and the God of the philosophers. He seemed to be suggest-
ing that philosophical inquiry does not make one really come to know 
God—at least not in the way God can and should be really known—and 
that this truly relevant form of knowledge of God requires certain moral 
attitudes, such as recognition of one’s own moral failings, repentance for 
one’s wrongdoings, disposition for self-sacrificial love, and trust (i.e., 
faith) in God. More recently, evidentialist epistemologist Paul Moser has 
drawn a distinction between two kinds of evidence with respect to God: 
spectator evidence and authoritative evidence. The first kind of evidence 
he associates with arguments from natural theology. Spectator evidence, 
however, is not, in Moser’s vocabulary, genuine theistic evidence: “God,” 
he claims, “would have no reason to offer spectator evidence of divine 
reality to humans.”48 Authoritative evidence, on the other hand, is evi-
dence “that includes a divine call to human transformation [that] would 
serve God’s redemptive purpose for humans.”49 Since the kind of theistic 
evidence that we are discussing in this paper (evidence from agreement 
with exceptional philosophers) does not ordinarily constitute what Moser 
calls authoritative evidence, we are to suppose that Moser would consider 
it to be spectator—i.e., non-genuine—theistic evidence.
I believe this objection fails if the primary distinction we have in mind 
is between propositional and personal theistic evidence and knowledge, 
47E.g., Frances, Disagreement.
48The Evidence for God, 211.
49The Evidence for God, 211.
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rather than between spectator and authoritative evidence and knowl-
edge. Even if Pascal and Moser are correct about the indispensability of 
the personal and moral components of theistic evidence and knowledge, 
it doesn’t follow that propositional evidence and knowledge should be 
considered non-genuine evidence and knowledge. Rather, propositional 
evidence is better seen as a different kind of evidence that can play an 
important role in moving us toward acquiring personal (and perhaps 
authoritative) theistic evidence and knowledge.50 Personal knowledge, to 
use Matthew Benton’s formulation,51 is obtained when we have a personal 
encounter of reciprocal causal contact with someone else and such knowl-
edge is symmetric and distinct from propositional knowledge. Arguably, 
personal knowledge of God is the highest aspiration a religious believer 
in the Abrahamic traditions can have. This can be granted while, at the 
same time, we recognize that God can also be known propositionally and 
that such propositional knowledge can be relevant for the attainment of 
that higher goal. Likewise, we can say that the sort of evidence that God 
ultimately desires for us to have regarding himself is personal evidence, 
but still recognize that one can gain propositional evidence pertaining to 
God, and that agreement with exceptional theistic philosophers can fur-
nish us with such evidence (which may, in the end, be a stepping stone, so 
to speak, for acquisition of personal theistic evidence).
Conclusion
In this paper, I defended a very modest claim: the realization that the 
most important philosophers of all time were theists should increase 
one’s confidence that theism is true (or, correspondently, reduce one’s 
confidence that theism is false). I haven’t said much about how much 
evidential support one can obtain from this realization. A number of con-
siderations seem to speak in favor of thinking that this evidential sup-
port is high: a majority (probably a supermajority) of the most important 
philosophers of all time agreed on theism; the pervasiveness and persis-
tence of theistic beliefs among exceptional philosophers: our exceptional 
philosophers worked in different cultural and intellectual environments, 
spanning over two millennia; despite strong disagreement on so many 
other philosophical questions, they agreed on theism; the current phil-
osophical landscape (the period in history with the largest expansion 
of university faculties and of investment in philosophical research) has 
become increasingly more receptive to philosophy of religion and to the 
50Moser (The Evidence for God, 210)  makes a further distinction between propositional 
and filial knowledge of “God’s reality as one’s humbly standing in a childlike, volitionally 
submissive relationship to God as perfectly authoritative and loving Lord and Father.” He 
claims that “filial knowledge of God requires propositional knowledge that God exists, but it 
exceeds such propositional knowledge.” This seems to commit Moser to the view that there 
is such a thing as genuine and important propositional theistic evidence.
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question of the existence of God;52 it is plausible to think that a substan-
tial majority of the contemporary philosophers voting on the philoso-
phers they regarded as the most important were atheists. On the other 
hand, these considerations seem to have their positive evidential force 
reduced by the fact that the poll focused on the most important, instead 
of the greatest, philosophers of all time. I have offered reasons to think 
that this consideration is not very significant, but have conceded that it 
should, nonetheless, be seen as detracting from the positive evidential 
value of the other considerations to some extent. How much? It is hard 
to say. But given that the positive considerations seem to be robust, it 
is plausible to think that although some of its evidential force may be 
counterbalanced, we are still left with, at a minimum, some evidence in 
favor of theism.53
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